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VOLUME 2013 NUMBER 2
Correcting a Flaw in the Arbitration
Fairness Act
Imre Stephen Szalai
The proposed Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013 will ban courts from enforcing
arbitration agreements in the employment and consumer contexts. This law will
protect America's employees and consumers by keeping the courthouse door open
to critical civil rights, employment, and consumer protection litigation. However,
the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act suffers from a subtle flaw: it is uncertain
whether the law will apply to the states. This flaw, which arises from one of the
greatest constitutional errors the Supreme Court has ever made, must be corrected
in order to provide the broadest protection to millions of American employees and
consumers, and to prevent years of needless litigation and confusion.
INTRODUCTION
Millions of American consumers and employees are unjustly bound by arbi-
tration agreements and forced into a secretive, second-class system of justice.
Pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA), arbitration agreements are
generally enforceable,' and courts today routinely enforce arbitration agreements
in the employment and consumer contexts. However, the FAA was never intend-
ed to apply broadly to all employment and consumer disputes. Instead, the Feder-
al Arbitration Act was designed to facilitate the arbitration of simple contract dis-
putes between two merchants.
Over the last few years, and most recently in the spring of 2013, members of
Congress have introduced bills to amend and restore the original intent of the
FAA. The 2013 bills, known as the Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA), prohibit the
enforcement of arbitration agreements in employment and consumer transactions.2
The supporters of these bills desire to protect employees and consumers who are
seeking a public court as a forum for enforcing some of the most important legis-
lation in American history, such as civil rights, wage and hour, and consumer
protection legislation.
- * J.D., Columbia University; B.A., Yale University; Professor, Loyola University New Orleans
College of Law.
1. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
2. H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 878, 113th Cong. (2013).
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Unfortunately, the proposed AFA suffers from a subtle flaw that will under-
mine these good intentions. Left uncorrected, this flaw may lead to needless con-
fusion, years of wasteful litigation, and weakened enforcement of civil rights,
employment, consumer protection, and antitrust laws. As explored in more detail
below, it is not clear whether the proposed AFA would apply solely in federal
court, or whether the proposed bill would also bind state courts. This flaw exists
because of a controversial Supreme Court decision, Southland Corp. v. Keating,3
which has been described as one of the greatest constitutional errors ever made by
the Supreme Court.4 If Congress enacts the AFA in its current form, employers
and large corporations may try to exploit this flaw and attempt to limit the applica-
tion of the statute by arguing that the AFA is not applicable in state court. These
arguments would involve much wasteful litigation and likely result in conflicting
decisions. Some state courts would likely accept these arguments and continue
forcing employees and consumers to submit their disputes to arbitration, thereby
undermining the goals of the AFA.
The AFA should be amended so that all courts, both state and federal, are
prohibited from enforcing arbitration agreements in the employment and consum-
er contexts. Part I of this article provides background on the need for the AFA.
This part provides an overview of the FAA, the application of the FAA to em-
ployment and consumer disputes, and the proposal to amend the FAA through the
enactment of the AFA of 2013. Part II of this article discusses the Supreme
Court's wrongly-decided Southland decision, and the resulting flaw in the AFA.
Part III concludes with simple solutions to correct this flaw, in order to provide
greater protection for millions of American employees and consumers.
I. THE NEED FOR THE ARBITRATION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2013
This section provides some background for understanding the need for the
proposed AFA. First, this section examines the FAA and its original purpose: to
facilitate arbitration of merchant-to-merchant disputes. Next, this section discuss-
es how courts have misconstrued the FAA, applying it to employment and con-
sumer disputes. This section concludes with an examination of the proposed
AFA, which would amend the FAA and restore its original meaning.
A. The Original Intent Behind the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925
Arbitration is a method of dispute resolution in which parties submit their
dispute to a neutral, private decision-maker, and arbitration has been used around
the world since ancient times.5 However, in the United States, prior to the 1920s,
courts generally refused to enforce arbitration agreements, particularly agreements
3. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
4. David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme
Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 54 (2004) ("In Southland, the
Court made an error of constitutional proportions that is in significant respects comparable to the error
of Swift v. Tyson, which the Court famously corrected [almost one hundred years later].").
5. See, e.g., DEREK ROEBUCK, EARLY ENGLIsH ARBITRATION (2008); DEREK ROEBUCK, ROMAN
ARBITRATION (2004); DEREK ROEBUCK, ANCIENT GREEK ARBITRATION (2001).
[Vol. 2013272
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to arbitrate future disputes.6 At the time, there was a prevailing belief that the
enforcement of arbitration agreements would improperly allow private parties to
limit government power and "oust" courts of the jurisdiction granted to them by
the United States Constitution.7 In 1925, arbitration law radically changed in the
United States when Congress enacted the FAA, which generally makes arbitration
agreements binding and enforceable.8
Multiple factors contributed to the enactment of the FAA and similar state
statutes during the 1920s. 9 A changing, growing national economy fostered the
desire for new laws making arbitration agreements binding and enforceable. 0
Before the development of a nationalized, interconnected economy, when mer-
chants primarily traded within small, local communities, merchants could utilize
arbitration without the need for strong arbitration laws. Informal pressures, such
as a desire to maintain one's reputation and business relationships within a small
community, encouraged local merchants to use arbitration and to voluntarily com-
ply with arbitration awards, without the need for strong arbitration laws. Howev-
er, such voluntary utilization and compliance with arbitration became more chal-
lenging as the American economy nationalized as the result of advances in tech-
nology, communication, industrialization, and transportation." Merchants trading
on a national level were hesitant to litigate disputes in unfamiliar forums, and
without a strong arbitration law to enforce arbitration agreements, they were also
hesitant to rely on arbitration proceedings. Thus, as the economy became more
nationalized, merchants desired an efficient, binding method of resolving disputes
out of court.
A broken court system further contributed to the enactment of the FAA. In
the early 1900s, merchants sought to avoid court, viewing the court system as a
broken failure, with highly technical, complex procedures and overcrowded dock-
ets.12 Merchants desired a quick, simple alternative to litigating in an antiquated
court system that was unresponsive to business needs.
In response to strong lobbying from dozens of businesses and trade organiza-
tions, Congress enacted the FAA in 1925.13 The operative language of the FAA
provided that arbitration agreements are "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable." 4
As such, the FAA reversed the prior law under which courts would refuse to en-
6. IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION - NATIONALIZATION -
INTERNATIONALIZATION 15-20 (1992). Although arbitration laws existed in America before the 1920s,
and such laws were generally supportive of arbitration, there was a "relative lack of enforceability" of
arbitration agreements before an arbitrator issued an award. Id at 19-20.
7. AtI. Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 5 F.2d 218, 220 (2d Cir. 1924) ("[A]ny agreement contained in
an executory contract, ousting in advance all courts of every whit of jurisdiction to decide contests
arising out of that contract, will not be enforced by the courts so ousted.").
8. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (arbitration agreements are "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable").
9. See generally, IMRE STEPHEN SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF MODERN
ARBITRATION LAWS IN AMERICA (2013) (exploring the many different people, institutions, forces,
beliefs, and events that led to the enactment of modern arbitration laws during the 1920s).
10. Id. at 98-99.
I1. Id.
12. Id. at 166-73.
13. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); see generally SZALAI, supra note 9.
14. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
No. 2] 273
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force arbitration agreements. The FAA facilitates arbitration and provides for
summary judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards."
As explained below, the history of the FAA's enactment and testimony pre-
sented in Congress in support of the FAA clearly indicate that the FAA was in-
tended to facilitate the arbitration of commercial disputes between merchants, not
employment or consumer disputes. The prototypical dispute covered by the
FAA was a simple contract dispute regarding the quality of goods sold between
two merchants located in different states.' 7  However, the Supreme Court has
expanded the meaning of the FAA far beyond its original purpose.
1. The Federal Arbitration Act Was Never Intended to Apply in the
Employment Context
The FAA was never intended to apply to labor or employment disputes.
When the FAA was enacted in 1925, Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution was narrowly construed, and labor and
employment disputes were generally considered to be local issues, not involving
interstate commerce.' 8 Therefore, because the FAA was enacted pursuant to Con-
gress' power under the Commerce Clause, the FAA generally could not be applied
to labor or employment disputes.
Although labor and employment issues were generally beyond the scope of
the Commerce Clause, one class of workers were viewed as engaged in interstate
commerce when the FAA was enacted. Transportation workers who crossed state
lines, such as railroad employees, were considered to be involved in interstate
commerce and were, therefore, subject to Congressional regulation.19 However,
section one of the FAA contained an exemption for such employees:
[N]othing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
20foreign or interstate commerce.
15. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-16 (2012).
16. See infra, Sections 1.A.1 and I.A.2.
17. For example, during a Congressional hearing in 1924, a witness testified that the FAA would
help support arbitration of a dispute between a seller of a carload of potatoes from Wyoming and a
dealer from New Jersey. Bills to Make Valid and Enforceable Written Provisions or Agreements for
Arbitration of Disputes Arising Out of Contracts, Maritime Transactions, or Commerce Among the
States or Territories or With Foreign Nations, Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 before the
Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1924). See also id. at 30-
31 (arbitration legislation would help reduce "business litigation" and encourage "business men" to
settle their "business differences"); id. at 41 ("If business men desire to submit their disputes to speedy
and expert decision, why should they not be enabled to do so?").
18. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (striking down as unconstitutional a feder-
al child labor law because the Commerce Clause did not cover employees working within a state to
produce items that will be shipped out of state), overruled by U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
19. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 136 (2001) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing The
Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 496, 498 (1908) (regulation of the employment relations of
railroad employees engaged in the operation of interstate commerce is permissible under the Com-
merce Clause, but regulation of a railroad company's clerical force is not)).
20. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
274 [Vol. 2013
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This explicit exemption of the only employees then regulated by the federal
government reveals that the statute was not intended to apply to employment dis-
putes. When Congress enacted the FAA, the narrow scope of the Commerce
Clause meant that most American workers were not covered by the statute. Addi-
tionally, the text of the FAA expressly exempts from its coverage the limited class
of workers engaged in interstate commerce.
The earliest drafts of the FAA did not contain the labor and employment ex-
emption now found in section one. 21 There was no need for the exemption be-
cause the FAA was drafted and intended for use in commercial disputes between
merchants, and because most employment and labor disputes were beyond the
scope of Congress' Commerce Clause powers. A labor and employment exemp-
tion was eventually added to the bill in an abundance of caution.22
When the bills that would become the FAA were first introduced in Congress
in 1923, the bills were sent to the Judiciary Committee, 23 which held hearings
regarding the bills. In January 1923, before one of the hearings, Senator Thomas
Sterling of South Dakota, a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, received a
letter from an important constituent, a prominent lawyer whose firm had signifi-
cant clients with employees involved in interstate transportation, such as large
24
railroad companies and parcel transportation businesses. The lawyer raised
concerns about the FAA's applicability to workers engaged in interstate com-
merce. Senator Sterling shared these concerns with Charles L. Bernheimer and
Julius H. Cohen, two leading, instrumental figures in the movement to reform
America's arbitration laws during the 1920s. 25
In preparation for a January 1923 hearing on the bills, Cohen drafted several
amendments in response to concerns raised by Senator Sterling and his constitu-
ent.26 One of these amendments was the labor and employment exemption now
found in section one of the FAA. Cohen summarized this amendment as having
the effect of "leav[ing] out labor disputes."27 Cohen did not view this section one
exemption as materially changing the bill.28 The section one exemption merely
clarified what was generally understood: the FAA was intended for commercial
disputes between merchants, not labor or employment disputes.
Additionally, in January 1923, labor interests were raising concerns about ar-
bitration. At the annual conference of the International Seamen's Union in New
York, the union's president, who was influential in passing important maritime
21. IMRE STEPHEN SZALAI, supra note 9, at 132-35, 142-45 (2013); AM. BAR Ass'N, ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION 315-318 (1922).
22. SZALAI, supra note 9, at 132-35, 142-45.
23. 65 CONG. REC. 40 (1923) (referring House bill to Committee on the Judiciary); 65 CONG. REC.
239 (1923) (referring Senate bill to Committee on the Judiciary).
24. SZALAI, supra note 9, at 133 (citing Letter from Thomas Sterling to Charles L. Bernheimer (Jan.
25, 1923), N.Y. Chamber of Commerce & Indus. Records Archival Collection, Series V, Rare Book &
Manuscript Library, Colum. Univ. in N.Y.C., Box 114, Folder 19).
25. SZALAI, supra note 9, at 133-35. Bernheimer and Cohen were heavily involved in drafting the
FAA and organizing the lobbying efforts in support of the FAA. See generally id. They were also
scheduled to testify at the January 1923 hearing of the Judiciary Committee. Id.
26. Id. at 133-35.
27. Id. at 135 (citing Letter from Julius H. Cohen to Charles L. Bemheimer (Jan. 29, 1923), N.Y.
Chamber of Commerce & Indus. Records Archival Collection, Series V, Rare Book & Manuscript
Library, Colum. Univ. in N.Y.C., Box 114, Folder 19).
28. Id at 134-35.
No. 2] 275
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laws protecting seamen, condemned the arbitration bills pending in Congress.29
He explained that seamen would have no choice and be forced to sign arbitration
agreements as a condition of employment, and if these agreements were enforcea-
ble under the law, seamen would lose the important procedural and constitutional
protections available in court. The exemption for labor and employment dis-
putes now found in section one of the FAA was added as an amendment to the
original bill in order to alleviate the concerns raised by labor interests.
Shortly before the January 1923 hearing, Charles Bernheimer, who was
known as the Father of Commercial Arbitration and the driving force behind the
enactment of the FAA, discussed these labor concerns with another supporter of
the pending arbitration bills. Bernheimer explained that labor groups were keenly
aware of any pending legislation that could "even remotely imperil [their] inter-
ests," and labor groups had "plenty of money to spend" to lobby and defeat legis-
lation.31 Bernheimer and his colleague discussed how the FAA was intended for
commercial disputes, not labor or employment disputes.32
During the January 1923 hearing, William H. H. Piatt, a lawyer who served as
the chairperson of the American Bar Association's Committee on Commerce,
Trade, and Commercial Law, testified in favor of the FAA, explaining that labor
interests need not worry about the FAA, because
[I]t was not the intention of the bill to have any such effect [compelling
arbitration of employment disputes.] It was not the intention of this bill to
make an industrial arbitration in any sense.3 3
In order to allay any concerns of labor interests, Piatt suggested that the bill
be amended to include the labor and employment exemption now found in section
one of the FAA.34 Piatt concluded his testimony by stressing the bill was intended
to cover commercial disputes between merchants, not labor and employment dis-
putes:
It is not intended that this shall be an act referring to labor disputes, at all.
It is purely an act to give the merchants the right or the privilege of sit-
ting down and agreeing with each other as to what their damages are, if
they want to do it. Now, that is all there is in this.35
Also in connection with the January 1923 hearing, Herbert Hoover, then the
Secretary of Commerce, submitted a letter for the record, which illustrated that the
29. Id at 131-32.
30. Id. at 132.
31. Id at 136.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 142 (citing A Bill Relating to Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce; and a Bill to Make Valid and Enforceable Written Provisions or Agreements for Arbitration of
Disputes Arising out of Contracts, Maritime Transactions, or Commerce Among the States or Territo-
ries or With Foreign Nations, Hearings on S. 4213 and S. 4214 before a Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 9 (1923)).
34. Id. at 142-43.
35. Id at 143.
[Vol. 2013276
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FAA was never intended to cover employment disputes. 36  In the letter, Hoover
recommended adding the exemption language to the pending bills.37 Hoover ex-
plained that the exemption should be added to prevent the "inclusion of workers'
contracts in the law's scheme." 38
About one month after the January 1923 Congressional hearing, Bernheimer
sent a letter to an editor of the Saturday Evening Post, which confirms that the
labor and employment exemption was added to section one of the FAA in order to
alleviate the concerns of labor interests. 39 In his letter, Bernheimer explained that
the bills were being amended to add the labor exemption in response to the objec-
tions of the Seamen's Union. 40  Bernheimer emphasized that as a result of the
amendment, "all industrial questions ha[d] been eliminated" from the reach of the
FAA.41
The text of the FAA, its legislative history, and the history behind its enact-
ment, clearly reveal that the FAA was intended to facilitate the arbitration of
commercial disputes between merchants, and that labor or employment disputes
were expressly removed from the purview of the FAA.
2. The Federal Arbitration Act Was Never Intended to Apply to
Take-I-Or-Leave-It Consumer Contracts
During the January 1923 hearing discussed above, Senator Thomas J. Walsh
of Montana raised concerns about enforcing arbitration clauses presented by a
party with stronger bargaining power on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis, such as a
standard, non-negotiable contract drafted by an insurance company.42 Senator
Walsh explained that such contracts are "not really voluntary contracts." 43 Piatt,
the American Bar Association lawyer who was testifying in favor of the FAA,
agreed with the Senator and explained that the FAA was not intended to apply to
such take-it-or-leave-it contracts." Rather, the purpose of the FAA was to facili-
36. Id. at 144-45 (citing A Bill Relating to Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign
Commerce; and a Bill to Make Valid and Enforceable Written Provisions or Agreements for Arbitra-
lion of Disputes Arising out of Contracts, Maritime Transactions, or Commerce Among the States or
Territories or With Foreign Nations, Hearings on S. 4213 and S. 4214 before a Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 14 (1923)).
37. Id. at 144. Although Hoover signed and submitted the letter, Bernheimer played a critical role in
obtaining the letter for the hearing. It appears that Bernheimer orchestrated the letter to come from
Hoover, and the letter contains the exemption drafted by Cohen a few days before the hearing. Id. at
145.
38. Id. at 144.
39. Id. at 152 (citing Letter from Charles L. Bernheimer to Isaac Marcosson (Mar. 2, 1923), N.Y.
Chamber of Commerce & Indus. Records Archival Collection, Series V, Rare Book & Manuscript
Library, Colum. Univ. in N.Y.C., Box 114, Folder 20).
40. Id. at 152-53.
41. Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 143 (citing A Bill Relating to Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce; and a Bill to Make Valid and Enforceable Written Provisions or Agreements for Arbitration of
Disputes Arising out of Contracts, Maritime Transactions, or Commerce Among the States or Territo-
ries or With Foreign Nations, Hearings on S. 4213 and S. 4214 before a Subcommittee of the Senate
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tate the resolution of commercial disputes between merchants who knowingly and
voluntarily agreed to arbitrate.45
The jurisdictional scope of the FAA in 1925 also helps demonstrate that the
FAA was not intended to cover consumer disputes. At the time the FAA was
enacted, in order for a federal court to have jurisdiction over a dispute, the dispute
had to involve at least $3,000.46 If adjusted for inflation, this amount of $3,000 in
1925 would be about $40,000 in 2013.47 Thus, disputes of small dollar amounts
were not intended to be heard by the federal judiciary. In an early draft of the
FAA, it was proposed that the $3,000 minimum be removed, so that the FAA
would cover disputes involving small dollar amounts.48 However, Congress re-
jected this early draft of the FAA. 49 Consequently, when the FAA was enacted, it
only applied to disputes where at least $3,000 was in controversy, an amount that
far exceeded the value of routine consumer transactions. Thus, the vast majority
of consumer contracts formed at the time of the FAA's enactment would not have
met the jurisdictional threshold of $3,000. As such, it is clear that Congress never
intended for the FAA to cover routine consumer contracts.
B. Courts Today Are Misconstruing the Federal Arbitration Act
The FAA was never intended to apply to employment disputes or consumer
contracts of adhesion. However, today it is common for courts to apply the FAA
in these two circumstances, forcing employees and consumers to submit their
disputes to private arbitration.
In a 2001 case, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the Supreme Court held
that the FAA applies to employment disputes.50 In this case, the former consumer
electronics retailer, Circuit City, invoked the FAA in federal court to enforce an
arbitration agreement with an employee.5 1 Circuit City filed its suit in order to
enjoin the employee from pursuing an employment discrimination lawsuit in state
court.52 The federal district court compelled arbitration of the employee's dis-
crimination claims. 53 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
the FAA did not apply to employment disputes.54 The Supreme Court granted
Circuit City's petition for certiorari in order to resolve a circuit split as to whether
the FAA applied to employment disputes.5 5
As explained above, the drafters of the FAA added the section one exemption
in order to make clear that the statute did not cover employment disputes. 5 How-
45. Id.
46. Both diversity and federal question jurisdiction required the amount in controversy exceed
$3,000. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, Pub. L. No. 61-475, § 24, 36 stat. 1087, 1091-94.
47. See US Inflation Calculator, COIN NEWS, http://www.usinflationcalculator.com.
48. SZALAI, supra note 9, at 123, 134, 181, 182.
49. Id.
50. 532 U.S. 105, 114 (2001).
51. Id at 110.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 105; see also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070, 1071-1072 (9th Cir.
1999).
55. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 110-111 (2001).
56. See supra notes 18-41 and accompanying text.
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ever, in Circuit City, the Court interpreted the section one exemption very narrow-
ly, construing it to reach the opposite conclusion. The majority interpreted the
exemption to refer solely to transportation workers, not all workers.57 Although
the section one exemption refers broadly to any "class of workers engaged in for-
eign or interstate commerce" as being beyond the purview of the statute, the
majority reasoned that this broad reference to workers should be interpreted nar-
rowly to refer solely to transportation workers because the exemption begins with
more specific references to seamen and railroad employees. 59 The majority relied
on a canon of statutory construction, providing that "[w]here general words follow
specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to em-
brace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding
specific words."60 Under this rationale, the general reference to workers in the
exemption should be interpreted narrowly as exempting only transportation work-
ers from the reach of the FAA. 6 ' Because the majority believed that the language
of the FAA was clear, the Court found it inappropriate to examine the FAA's
legislative history.62 Under the Supreme Court's Circuit City holding, only trans-
portation workers are excluded from the FAA's coverage, and thus, all other em-
ployment relationships fall within the FAA's coverage.63
Justices Stevens and Souter each wrote strong dissenting opinions, both of
which were joined by the other dissenter as well as Justices Ginsburg and Brey-
er.M The dissenters criticized the majority for "playing ostrich" with the history
and background of the FAA. 65 The dissenters explained that the FAA was intend-
ed to cover only commercial disputes,66 and that at the time of the FAA's enact-
ment, employment relationships were not considered to be within the scope of
Congress' Commerce Clause power.67 The only employment relationships subject
to such power were workers who were actually engaged in interstate commerce,
like railroad workers.68 And, as discussed above, Congress chose to explicitly
remove such workers from the reach of the FAA. Considering the historical con-
text and the legislative history, the dissenters explained that Congress intended to
exclude all employment relationships from the coverage of the FAA.69
Following the majority opinion in Circuit City, courts today routinely enforce
arbitration agreements in the employment context, and employees are forced to
bring many important discrimination, harassment, and wage and hour disputes to
57. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 109.
58. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
59. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 114-15.
60. Id. at 114-15 (citations omitted).
61. Id. at 114-15, 118-19.
62. Id. at 119 ("As the conclusion we reach today is directed by the text of § 1, we need not assess
the legislative history of the exclusion provision.").
63. Id. ("Section [one] exempts from the FAA only contracts of employment of transportation work-
ers.").
64. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 124 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id at 133 (Souter, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 125-29.
67. Id. at 136 (Souter, J., dissenting).
68. Id. (citing The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 496, 498 (1908)).
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private arbitrators in proceedings with very limited procedural rights.7o However,
Congress never intended to create this scheme of private arbitral tribunals for
employment disputes.7 1
It has also become routine for courts to order consumers to submit their dis-
putes to arbitration, even where the consumer clearly lacked bargaining power and
the arbitration agreement is contained in a contract of adhesion. The Supreme
Court has found consumer claims to be subject to arbitration in connection with
credit card agreements,72 cell phone agreements, nursing home contracts,74 and
check cashing transactions.75  Lower courts also routinely compel arbitration of
consumers' claims. 76 However, as explained above, the FAA was intended to
cover commercial disputes between merchants, not small consumer disputes aris-
ing from "take-it-or-leave-it" contracts between parties with unequal bargaining
power.77
C The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013
Over the past few years, Congress has made numerous attempts to limit the
use of arbitration and the scope of the FAA.78 However, to date, the legislature
has only successfully restricted the use of arbitration in limited, particular circum-
stances. For example, in 2001, Congress passed a law prohibiting automobile
manufacturers from requiring franchisees to enter into pre-dispute arbitration
agreements.79 Also, in 2010, as a part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Congress authorized the newly-created Consumer Fi-
nancial Protection Bureau to regulate arbitration agreements in contracts for con-
sumer financial products and services.80 However, the Consumer Financial Pro-
tection Bureau has yet to issue regulations regarding arbitration. Although there
have been some limited successes in restricting the use of arbitration and scaling
70. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. 13-861, 2013 WL 3087598 (D.N.J. June 18,
2013) (claims of discrimination on the basis of race and disability); Anderson v. Waffle House, Inc.,
920 F.Supp.2d 685 (E.D. La. 2013) (sexual harassment claims); Compton v. Frisch's Restaurants, Inc.,
No. 2:12-cv-858, 2013 WL 1500211 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 10, 2013) (unpaid wages, overtime, and mini-
mum wage violations).
71. See supra notes 18-41 and accompanying text.
72. See CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012).
73. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
74. See Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012).
75. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
76. See generally Byrd v. SunTrust Bank, No. 2:12-CV-02314-JPM-CGC, 2013 WL 3816714
(W.D. Tenn. July 22, 2013) (dispute between consumers and bank regarding the collection of overdraft
fees); Villalobos v. EZCorp, Inc., No. 12-CV-852-SLC, 2013 WL 3732875 (W.D. Wis. July 15,
2012) (payday loan); Cappuccitti v. DirecTV, Inc., 623 F.3d 1118 (11th Cir. 2010) (satellite television
services).
77. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
78. Thomas V. Burch, Regulating Mandatory Arbitration, 2011 UTAH L. REv. 1309, 1332-34 (2011)
(recognizing that between 1995 and 2010, 139 bills were introduced in Congress to eliminate or restrict
the use of arbitration, and only 5 of these bills became law).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (2012) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, whenever a motor
vehicle franchise contract provides for the use of arbitration to resolve a controversy arising out of or
relating to such contract, arbitration may be used to settle such controversy only if after such contro-
versy arises all parties to such controversy consent in writing to use arbitration to settle such controver-
sy.").
80. 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2012).
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back the scope of the FAA, the more ambitious legislative attempts to ban arbitra-
tion broadly in the consumer and employment contexts have thus far failed. Over
the past decade, several bills have been introduced in Congress to limit the use of
arbitration in the consumer and employment contexts,8 ' and these bills have gen-
erally died in committee, without making it to the floor of the House or Senate for
a vote.
The most recent legislative attempt to enact a broad ban was in the spring of
2013, when Senator Al Franken of Minnesota and Representative Hank Johnson
of Georgia introduced identical bills in Congress known as the Arbitration Fair-
ness Act of 2013 (AFA). 82 The introduction to the AFA includes several Con-
gressional findings.83  The introduction recognizes that the FAA was originally
intended to cover disputes between commercial entities with relatively equal bar-
gaining power, and explains that the Supreme Court has expanded the scope of
the FAA, applying it to consumer and employment disputes, "contrary to the in-
tent of Congress."8 The introduction further explains that most consumers and
employees have no meaningful choice in whether to submit their claims to arbitra-
tion, and they often are not aware that they have given up the right to go to court.
Additionally, the introduction recognizes that arbitration can "undermine[ ] the
development of public law." 87
The principal provision of the AFA, titled "Validity and enforceability,"
states that "no predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it
requires arbitration of an employment dispute, consumer dispute, antitrust dispute,
or civil rights dispute."88 This section, which amends the FAA, would broadly
ban arbitration agreements in contexts where they are commonly used today.89
81. See, e.g., H.R. 815, 107th Cong. (2001) (banning pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the em-
ployment context); S. 2435, 107th Cong. (2002) (same); H.R. 3809, 108th Cong. (2004) (same); H.R.
2969, 109th Cong. (2005) (same); H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007) (banning pre-dispute arbitration
agreements in the consumer, franchise, and employment contexts); H.R. 991, 11th Cong. (2009)
(banning pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer contracts); H.R. 1020, 11th Cong. (2009)
(banning pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the consumer, franchise, and employment contexts);
H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011) (banning pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer and employ-
ment contracts); S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011) (same).
82. S. 878, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. (2013). These two bills are identical.
83. S. 878 § 2; H.R. 1844 § 2.
84. S. 878 § 2(1); H.R. 1844 § 2(1).
85. S. 878, § 2(2); H.R. 1844 § 2(2).
86. S. 878 § 2(3); H.R. 1844 § 2(3).
87. S. 878 § 2(4); H.R. 1844 § 2(4). The introduction explains that arbitration undermines public law
"because there is inadequate transparency and inadequate judicial review of arbitrators' decisions." S.
878 § 2(4); H.R. 1844 § 2(4).
88. S. 878 § 3; H.R. 1844 § 3.
89. S. 878 § 3; H.R. 1844 § 3. The AFA also contains definitions of the disputes exempted by the
statute. Most of the definitions are straightforward. For example, an employment dispute is a dispute
between an employer and employee, and a civil rights dispute covers claims arising under a state or
federal constitution and claims arising under federal or state laws prohibiting discrimination. S. 878 §
3; H.R. 1844 § 3. A consumer dispute is broadly defined to cover disputes "between an individual
who seeks or acquires real or personal property, services (including services relating to securities and
other investments), money, or credit for personal, family, or household purposes and the seller or
provider of such property, services, money, or credit." S. 878 § 3; H.R. 1844 § 3. The definition of
antitrust dispute differs from the other definitions because it contains a procedural component. The
definition of antitrust dispute under the AFA covers a claim for a violation of federal or state antitrust
law, but only if the claim is brought as a class action. S. 878 § 3; H.R. 1844 § 3.
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According to its sponsors, the AFA seeks to "[r]estore[] the original intent of the
FAA. . . ."90 By ignoring and twisting the original meaning of a statute enacted by
the legislative branch, the judiciary creates a breakdown in America's democratic,
constitutional system of government. The AFA is justified on the basis of restor-
ing the original intent of Congress in enacting the FAA and overturning flawed,
expansive Supreme Court decisions.
In addition to correcting this separation of powers problem, there are other
justifications for the AFA. Although not explicitly stated in the AFA's introduc-
tory findings, statements of sponsors have made it clear that the AFA is intended
to address recent Supreme Court decisions relying on the FAA in order to limit the
availability of class proceedings:
This series of [Supreme Court] holdings erodes the rights of consumers and
further immunizes corporations from accountability. The [FAA] was originally
passed to ensure that the courts enforced commercial arbitration agreements be-
tween two companies, not between companies and consumers. The Supreme
Court's expanded interpretation of the FAA allows companies to insulate them-
selves from liability when they defraud a large number of customers of a relative-
ly small amount of money.9'
Class actions have played an important role in American society by providing
collective relief to large groups of individuals when the pursuit of individual
claims would not be feasible. However, current interpretations of the FAA threat-
en the availability of class actions. Requiring arbitration of consumer disputes is
very attractive to companies, because if a plaintiff consumer seeks to certify a
class action in court, the court will be required to compel arbitration, and the
plaintiff will generally be required to arbitrate his claim on an individual basis.92
Compelling individual arbitration effectively forecloses the pursuit of a class ac-
tion in court and helps insulate companies from class action liability, and a class
action is one of the few swords available to consumers with small damages.9 3
However, it was never the intent of Congress for the FAA to be used as a shield
for class action liability. When Congress enacted the FAA in 1925, modem, com-
plex class-action litigation did not even exist,94 making it impossible for Congress
to have contemplated that arbitration agreements could prohibit parties from pur-
suing class action relief in court. If the AFA is enacted, arbitration clauses could
90. Sen. Franken Leads Charge to Protect Legal Right to Day in Court, SEN. AL FRANKEN (May 7,
2013), http://www.franken.senate.gov/?p-press release&id=2392; Rep. Johnson Re-Introduces Bill to
Protect Legal Rights of Consumers, REP. HANK JOHNSON (May 7, 2013),
http://hankjohnson.house.gov/press-release/rep-johnson-re-introduces-bill-protect-legal-rights-
consumers.
91. Rep. Johnson Re-Introduces Bill to Protect Legal Rights of Consumers, supra note 90.
92. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011).
93. Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) ("The realistic alternative to
a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic
sues for $30.") (alteration in original).
94. Although representative actions were allowed in equity for limited types of relief, class actions
for damages did not become available in America until the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1938. Modem class actions did not really exist until 1966, when Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure was significantly overhauled. WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., I NEWBERG
ON CLASS ACTIONS §§ 1.12-1.15 (5th ed. 2011).
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no longer be used as a shield against class action liability, and consumers and
employees would be able to pursue class actions in court.9 5
Another justification for the enactment of the AFA is the importance of de-
veloping public law. The introductory section of the AFA recognizes that
"[m]andatory arbitration undermines the development of public law because there
is inadequate transparency and inadequate judicial review of arbitrators' deci-
sions."9 Forcing consumers and employees into arbitration can undermine im-
portant civil rights and consumer protection laws. When disputes are arbitrated,
there is rarely an opportunity for appellate review, as the standard of review for
arbitral awards is "among the narrowest known at law,"97 requiring that courts
affirm even "grave error[s]" by an arbitrator.98 Conversely, when disputes are
litigated in court, errors by the trial court are typically reversible on appeal.99
Appellate review helps ensure that important laws, like civil rights laws and con-
sumer protection laws, are being applied correctly. 00 Public access to trial and
appellate court decisions contributes to the development and better understanding
of law. A body of publicly-available precedent assists judges in deciding cases
and applying the law uniformly, and such publicly-available decisions can help
inform the public about the meaning of a law. Of course, courts can reach con-
flicting decisions, but having publicly accessible decisions can highlight close
legal questions for legislatures and appellate courts to address and clarify. Often,
conflict between the decisions of various jurisdictions is what notifies legislatures
of a need for legislative action or reform. Publicly-available judicial decisions aid
development, understanding, and compliance with the law.' 0'
When voluntarily entered into, arbitration can be fair and mutually advanta-
geous to both parties involved in a proceeding. However, arbitration can also be
used to disadvantage weaker parties. Stronger parties, like employers and corpo-
rations, can tilt the scales in their favor, as the party drafting the arbitration
agreement. The party that drafts such agreements controls the terms and can take
95. Also, as mentioned above, the AFA exempts antitrust disputes from the coverage of the FAA,
but only if the plaintiff is seeking class relief S. 878, 113th Cong. § 3 (2013); H.R. 1844, 113th Cong.
§ 3 (2012). This definition is not limited to particular categories of plaintiffs, like consumers or em-
ployees. Thus, corporate franchisees seeking to bring antitrust class actions against a franchisor could
rely on the protections of the AFA, and such disputes could not be subject to a binding pre-dispute
arbitration clause. As a result, the AFA would in effect overrule the result in American Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013), where the Supreme Court reversed the Second
Circuit's invalidation of an arbitration clause in connection with an antitrust class action. Id. at 2308-
2312.
96. S. 878 § 2(4); H.R. 1844 § 2(4).
97. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Bishop, 596 F.3d 183, 184 (4th Cir. 2010) ("We are mindful
that vacatur of an arbitration award is, and must be, a rare occurrence because a federal court employs
a standard of review 'among the narrowest known at law."') (alteration in original) (citation omit-
ted). See also 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (setting forth the standards for vacatur of an arbitration award).
98. Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S.Ct. 2064, 2070 (2013) ("All we say is that convincing
a court of an arbitrator's error-even his grave error-is not enough.").
99. See, e.g., Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 196 (5th Cir. 1998) ("We review
questions of law de novo and questions of fact for clear error.").
100. See generally Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012);
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p (2012).
101. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (discussing how stare decisis "promotes
the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial
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the opportunity to impose severe limitations and unfair provisions, making it more
challenging for employees and consumers to bring claims.
In Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, an employer drafted an arbitration
agreement requiring arbitration procedures that a court later described as "egre-
giously unfair" and "utterly lacking in the rudiments of even-handedness.", 02 The
arbitration agreement required the employee to provide the employer notice of the
claim from the outset, together with a list of fact witnesses, while the employer
was not required to reciprocate with a responsive pleading, notice of its defenses,
or any information about the employer's witnesses. 0 3  The agreement further
required that the employee select an arbitrator from a list generated exclusively by
the employer, and summary judgment procedures were only available to the em-
ployer."0 In addition, the employer drafted appellate procedures allowing the
employer to bring suit to vacate an award if the employer could show, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, that the arbitrators exceeded their authority. 0 5 How-
ever, such appellate rights were not granted to employees.' 0 6 The court found that
the employer had unfairly set up a "sham" system,10 7 and refused to enforce the
arbitration agreement. os
Of course, not all arbitration agreements will be as extreme as the one de-
scribed in Hooters, involving unfairness at all stages of arbitration. However,
employers and corporations can draft arbitration provisions that, while not as se-
vere as those imposed by Hooters, place a thumb on the scales of justice, making
it more difficult for employees and consumers to vindicate their statutory rights.
For example, employers and corporations can draft arbitration agreements limiting
the time in which claims can be brought, limiting discovery rights, and adopting
procedures that make it more difficult for individuals to bring a claim successful-
ly. And, despite the intent of Congress in enacting the FAA, courts have enforced
such agreements against consumers and employees. 109
Unfair arbitration agreements have weakened the impact of some of the na-
tion's most important laws. Civil rights laws, wage and hour laws, and laws disal-
lowing unfair business practices provide invaluable protections to vulnerable
102. Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 935, 938 (4th Cir. 1999).
103. Id. at 938.
104. Id. at 938-39.
105. Id. at 939. Prior to 2008, there was a circuit split regarding whether parties could expand the
scope of judicial review of an arbitration award beyond the statutory grounds provided by the
FAA. The Supreme Court resolved this circuit split by holding that the FAA provides the exclusive
grounds for judicial review. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 578 (2008).
106. Hooters, 173 F.3d at 939.
107. Id. at 940.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Affholter v. Franklin Cnty. Water Dist., No. 1:07-CV-0388 OWW DLB, 2008 WL
5385810 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2008) (enforcing arbitration agreement which provided for only one
deposition as a matter of right); Rutter v. Darden Rests., Inc., No. CV 08-6106 AHM (SSx), 2008 WL
4949043 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2008) (enforcing arbitration agreement limiting discovery to 90 day
period and the arbitration hearing to 2 days, unless extended by the arbitrator); Wernett v. Serv. Phoe-
nix, LLC, No. CIV 09-168-TUC-CKJ, 2009 WL 1955612 (D. Ariz. July 6, 2009) (permitting discov-
ery limit of two depositions); Baumann v. Finish Line, Inc., No. 1:08-cv-1385-UM-JMS, 2009 WL
2750094, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 26, 2009) (recognizing that an arbitration agreement may shorten a
statute of limitations); Damato v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., No. 13-CV-994 (ARR)(RML), 2013 WL
3968765 (E.D.N.Y. July 31, 2013) (enforcing arbitration agreement where agreement shrinks the
statute of limitations, limits damages, and limits appeals).
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groups.11o The same policies that underlie legislation protecting vulnerable em-
ployees and consumers also provide support for the AFA. Enactment of the AFA
would help preserve a public forum with broad procedural opportunities to en-
force employee and consumer rights. When a court finds that an employer has
violated civil rights or wage and overtime laws, the negative publicity surrounding
such a ruling may have a shaming effect and discourage future wrongdoing by the
defendant, as well as other employers. However, if such an employer has arbitra-
tion agreements with all of its employees, the employer's wrongdoing may not
easily come to light. Employees bound by arbitration agreements with limited
procedural rights, such as limited discovery, may find it difficult to obtain coun-
sel. Counsel may find arbitration, with its limited procedural rights, more chal-
lenging and less lucrative than litigation, with its broad procedural rights, includ-
ing broad discovery and the right to a jury trial. As a result, many employees who
hoped to vindicate their statutory rights may not even be able to bring a claim
because of the difficulty in obtaining counsel. Even if a claim is brought to arbi-
tration, the entire dispute may remain confidential, and the benefits of a public
ruling are lost.
Finally, the AFA would reinforce the legitimacy of arbitration and build pub-
lic confidence in the American justice system. Courts have compelled arbitration
in situations where employees were not aware of an arbitration clause buried in
their employment agreement or in a company manual,"' and where customers did
not know of an arbitration clause kept behind the counter at a store.' 12 In cases
such as these, consent to arbitrate does not truly exist. Absent actual consent to
arbitrate disputes, compelling arbitration undermines the legitimacy of the arbitra-
tion proceeding itself, as the power of the arbitrator is supposed to be derived
from the agreement of the parties.113 Additionally, compelling arbitration under
these circumstances damages the public's trust in the equity of our justice system.
Forcing employees and consumers into arbitration when they were completely
unaware of an arbitration clause, under the auspices of the FAA, in order to clear
crowded dockets, undermines the public's confidence in our legal system. By
disallowing pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the employment and consumer
contexts, the AFA will help ensure that the submission of disputes to arbitration is
always a voluntary and conscious choice.
In sum, there are several justifications supporting the enactment of the AFA.
Among other things, the AFA addresses a serious separation of powers problem,
restores the availability of class actions for consumers and employees, promotes
110. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012); Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 to 219 (2012).
111. See, e.g., Tinder v. Pinkerton Sec., 305 F.3d 728, 735-36 (7th Cir. 2002), aff'g No. 00-C-0170-C,
2000 WL 34237496 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 25, 2000) (enforcing arbitration agreement distributed as a
"payroll stuffer" included with a paycheck, even though employee was not aware of the payroll stuff-
er); Scrivner v. ACE USA, No. 07-1329, 2007 WL 4124497, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 2007) ("The
plaintiffs argument that she did not know the contents of, and was never given, the [Employee Guide
containing the employer's arbitration policy] is unavailing.").
112. See James v. McDonald's Corp., 417 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2005) (McDonald's customer was bound
to arbitrate because of language appearing on a french fry carton, which in turn directed the customer
to read rules posted near the service counter).
113. See Filho v. Safra Nat. Bank of New York, 489 F. App'x 483, 484 (2d Cir. 2012) ("consent is
the foundation of arbitration") (citations omitted).
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the development of law, and supports the policies underlying critical consumer
rights and civil rights legislation.
II. THE ARBITRATION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2013 FAILS TO ADDRESS THE
SUPREME COURT'S FLAWED SOUTHLAND DECISION
A. The Federal Arbitration Act is a Procedural Statute,
Only Applicable in Federal Court
The FAA was originally intended to be a procedural statute applicable solely
in federal court, not state court. The late Professor Ian Macneil wrote an excellent
book thoroughly explaining the original intent in enacting the statute.1 4 As point-
ed out by Macneil, there is a strong textual argument that the FAA was never in-
tended to apply in state court.' 1 5 The FAA is a fully "integrated, unitary stat-
ute.",' Sections one and two of the statute set forth key definitions and the core
principle that arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable. 1 7
The remaining provisions of the FAA all support and implement the core principle
of section two." 8 One of these implementing sections, section four, provides the
procedure by which "United States District Court[s]" may compel arbitration."l 9
Section four does not mention state courts.120 Because the FAA is a fully integrat-
ed, unitary, procedural statute, the specific reference in section four to federal
courts makes it clear that the FAA was drafted for use only in the federal courts,
not state courts.121
As Professor Macneil explains, the enforcement of arbitration agreements at
the time of the FAA's enactment was viewed as a remedial issue, within the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the forum court where enforcement was sought.122 In other
words, arbitration was considered merely a procedure to resolve a dispute, and the
enforcement of arbitration agreements was within the law of procedure, not sub-
stantive law.123 As a result, the issue of whether an arbitration agreement is en-
forceable is a question of procedure and determined by the procedural law of the
court where a proceeding is brought, not a matter of substantive law of the forum
where the contract was made.124 Testimony before Congressional committees and
Congressional reports confirm this understanding, that the FAA, as a procedural
statute, was limited in applicability to federal courts, not the state courts.12 5
114. IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION - NATIONALIZATION -
INTERNATIONALIZATION (1992).
115. Id. at 102-107.
116. Id. at 105. The statute sets forth a key principle, that an agreement to arbitrate is binding, and
every provision of the FAA supports this key principle. None of the provisions of the FAA can stand
alone or are meant to be interpreted separately from the rest of the statute. Id at 105-06.
117. Id. at 102.
118. Id. at 102-05.
119. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012); MACNEIL, supra note 114, at 102-03.
120. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012); MACNEIL,supra note 114, at 102-03.
121. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012); MACNEIL, supra note 114, at 102-07.
122. Id. at 109-11.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 110-13.
286 [Vol. 2013
16
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2013, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2013/iss2/2
Correcting a Flaw in the Arbitration Fairness Act
Macneil also emphasized that when the FAA was enacted, there was a com-
plete lack of opposition.' 26 If the FAA were intended to apply in state courts and
force states to grant specific performance of arbitration agreements, then the FAA
would likely have been viewed, and opposed at least by some, as an "extraordi-
nary expansion" of federal power and a "massive interference with state law." 27
However, the complete lack of opposition to the FAA's enactment substantiates
the evidence that the FAA was intended to be applicable only in the federal
courts. 28
In sum, for about six decades, from the FAA's enactment in 1925 until about
1984, the FAA was considered a procedural statute applicable only in federal
court. Because of the text of the FAA, which clearly limited its application solely
to federal court, and because the enforcement of an arbitration agreement was a
procedural remedy, governed by the law of the forum court, states were free to
develop their own laws regarding arbitration.129
B. The Supreme Court's Flawed Southland Decision
In the 1984 case, Southland Corp. v. Keating, a majority of Supreme Court
justices ignored the history and language of the FAA and transformed the FAA
into a statute applicable in both federal and state court. 130 The Southland case
started when franchisees filed lawsuits in California state court against the South-
land Corporation, the owner and franchisor of 7-Eleven convenience stores.13'
The plaintiffs alleged fraud, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and vio-
lations of disclosure requirements under the California Franchise Investment
Law.1 32 Southland responded by asking the court to enforce the arbitration clause
in the franchise agreement.' 33 The lower court granted Southland's motion to
compel arbitration with respect to all claims, except for those arising out of the
California franchise law.134 The trial court found, and the California Supreme
Court affirmed, that claims based on the California franchise law could not be
subject to arbitration because the law guaranteed a judicial forum for such claims,
and waivers of the statute's protections were void. 35
The Supreme Court of the United States granted Southland's petition for cer-
tiorari, reversed the California Supreme Court, and changed the meaning and
reach of the FAA.136 Instead of reading the statute as a unified whole, the Su-
preme Court's decision analyzed only section two of the FAA in isolation; section
two provides that arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.'37
126. Id. at 115-17.
127. Id. at 115.
128. Id. at 115-17.
129. See WESLEY A. STURGES, A TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AWARDS 88-96
(1930) (exploring differences in the arbitration laws of various states from the 1920s).
130. 465 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1984).
131. Id. at 1, 4.
132. Id. at 4.
133. Id
134. Id.
135. Id. at 4-5, 10.
136. Id. at 1-2.
137. Id. at 10; see also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
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The Supreme Court explained that this section mandates the enforceability of
arbitration agreements, and there is nothing to indicate that this "broad principle
of enforceability is subject to any additional limitations under State law."' 38 The
Supreme Court next explained that the FAA "rests on the [power] of Congress to
enact substantive [laws] under the Commerce Clause," and that such laws are
generally enforceable in both state and federal courts.' 39
The Supreme Court found that the non-waiver provisions of the California
franchise law violated the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. 140 The Court
reasoned that when Congress enacts a substantive law, the law is enforceable in
both state and federal court. 14 1 Additionally, the Court ruled that, in passing the
FAA, Congress intended to foreclose states' legislative attempts to undermine the
enforceability of arbitration agreements.142 Thus, the Court reversed the Califor-
nia Supreme Court's decision denying enforcement of the arbitration clause.143
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Rehnquist, authored a forceful dissent.,"
Justice O'Connor explained that the majority's decision was motivated by an "un-
derstandable desire to encourage the use of arbitration," but that Congress never
intended for state courts to apply the FAA.145 Justice O'Connor cited several parts
of the legislative history, demonstrating that the drafters viewed enforcement of
arbitration agreements as part of the law of remedies.14 6 As such, they designed
the FAA as a rule of procedure derived from Congress' power to dictate procedure
for federal courts, not a substantive law.147 Hence, the FAA, as a procedural law,
would apply only in federal court.148
The dissent also noted that the structure of the FAA contradicted the majori-
ty's ruling.149 Section four of the FAA implements the core principle established
in section two, that arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
and section four applies only in federal court.1so The dissent concluded by ex-
plaining that the majority's decision was an "exercise in judicial revisionism,"
"unfaithful to Congressional intent, unnecessary, and, in light of the FAA's ante-
cedents and the intervening contraction of federal power, inexplicable." 5 1
After Southland, other Supreme Court Justices joined the ranks of the South-
land dissenters, O'Connor and Rehnquist, and agreed that the Southland decision
was deeply flawed. About a decade after Southland, in a case called Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, Justice Thomas wrote a strong dissent explaining why
138. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10-11.
139. Id. at 11-12.
140. Id. at 10, 16.
141. Id. at 16.
142. Id.
143. Id at 17.
144. Id. at 21-36 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
145. Id at 22-23.
146. Id. at 25-28.
147. Id.
148. Id. Justice O'Connor's argument is quite brief: "Congress believed that the FAA established
nothing more than a rule of procedure, a rule therefore applicable only in the federal courts." Id. at 26
(alteration in original). The idea is that Congress has the constitutional power to control procedure in
the federal courts, not state courts. Id. at 25-28.
149. Id. at 29.
150. Id See also supra notes 115-21 and accompanying text; 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012).
151. Southland, 465 U.S. at 36 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Southland was wrongly decided.152 He cited many sources demonstrating that the
enforcement of an arbitration agreement concerns procedure.153 As a procedural
statute used to resolve underlying disputes, the FAA governs only in federal
courts because Congress cannot "prescribe procedural rules for state courts."' 54
Justice Thomas further explained that if Southland were correct that section two of
the FAA created a substantive right, section two would establish federal subject
matter jurisdiction. 55 However, the remaining sections of the FAA are drafted as
if federal subject matter jurisdiction does not automatically exist. For example,
section four of the FAA provides that jurisdiction to enforce an arbitration agree-
ment exists if a federal court would have subject matter jurisdiction over the un-
derlying dispute to be arbitrated.'5 7 Such jurisdictional language would be unnec-
essary if section two created substantive rights establishing federal subject matter
jurisdiction. Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas' dissent in Allied-Bruce, adding
that, in the future, he would "stand ready to join four other Justices in overruling
[Southland], since Southland will not become more correct over time.. . ."s5
It is important to emphasize how Southland helped transform the FAA.
Southland transformed the FAA from a procedural statute, applicable solely in
federal court, into a substantive statute, applicable in state court and preempting
state laws. Additionally, Southland helped transform the FAA into a statute cov-
ering small consumer disputes. Pursuant to section four of the FAA, there is a
$75,000 jurisdictional minimum in order for a federal court to have subject matter
jurisdiction in connection with a FAA proceeding to compel arbitration of a non-
federal, contractual dispute. 5 9 For example, under the original, pre-Southland
understanding of the FAA as a statute applicable solely in federal court, a federal
court would have jurisdiction to compel arbitration of a fraud or contract dispute
arising from the purchase of a product or service only if the dispute exceeded
$75,000, and most routine consumer transactions would never trigger such a high
jurisdictional threshold.16 0 Pre-Southland, a high amount in controversy require-
ment in federal court had the intended effect of keeping relatively small contractu-
al disputes outside of the scope of the FAA.'' However, when the Supreme
Court decided Southland, the Supreme Court ignored the unified, comprehensive
nature of the FAA and held that section two of the FAA, by itself, applied in state
152. 513 U.S. 265, 285-97 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 286-89.
154. Id. at 286-88.
155. Id. at 291.
156. Id.
157. Id; 9 U.S.C. §4 (2012) ("A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another
to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court
which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty
of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an order directing
that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.").
158. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 285 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
159. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012). Section four of the FAA provides a federal court with jurisdiction to
compel arbitration if the federal court has jurisdiction over the dispute to be arbitrated. 9 U.S.C. § 4
(2012).
160. As explained above, the jurisdictional minimum for federal courts in 1925 was $3,000, which
amounts to about $40,000 in 2013 dollars. With such a jurisdictional minimum, Congress intended to
exclude small consumer claims from the FAA's coverage. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying
text.
161. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
No. 2] 289
19
Szalai: Szalai:Correcting a Flaw
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
courts, which tend not to have jurisdictional minimums. Thus, as a result of
Southland, the $75,000 jurisdictional minimum established by section four of the
FAA is not a requirement in state court. Through Southland, the FAA could cover
contractual disputes of relatively small dollar amounts in state court, and South-
land thereby helped open the door for the FAA to cover relatively small consumer
disputes.
In sum, the Supreme Court in Southland transformed the FAA into a statute
also applicable in state court, and this flawed Southland decision is still the gov-
erning law today. As originally enacted, however, the FAA was intended to apply
solely in federal court.
C. It is Unclear How the Arbitration Fairness Act Interacts with the
Flawed Southland Decision
It is not entirely clear how the proposed AFA interacts with the flawed South-
land decision. It is not clear whether the AFA is adopting the pre-Southland or
post-Southland view of the FAA. This ambiguity makes it uncertain whether
states must abide by the AFA's prohibitions regarding the arbitration of antitrust,
employment, civil rights, and consumer disputes. If the AFA is adopting the pre-
Southland view, the AFA's prohibitions would bind only federal courts, but if the
AFA is adopting the post-Southland view, both federal courts and state courts
must follow the AFA's prohibitions. There are arguments in favor of both views.
1. The Post-Southland Interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act
Perhaps the drafters of the AFA are treating Southland as good law, and they
regard the FAA as applicable in both federal and state courts. If the drafters are
adopting this post-Southland understanding of the FAA, the AFA would effective-
ly prohibit both state courts and federal courts from compelling arbitration of anti-
trust, employment, civil rights, and consumer disputes.
There are some arguments in favor of reading the AFA as embodying a post-
Southland understanding of the FAA. If the AFA presumes that Southland re-
mains good law, its prohibitions will bind both state and federal courts. The sup-
porters of the AFA have emphasized the protections that it would provide to
workers and consumers, and the post-Southland view would provide greater pro-
tections to these parties than would the pre-Southland view. Additional support
for the view that the AFA incorporates the post-Southland understanding of the
FAA is found in the AFA's definition of "antitrust dispute." The AFA defines an
"antitrust dispute" as a claim for alleged violations of federal or state antitrust
laws in which the plaintiffs seek class certification under Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, or comparable state class action rules.16 2 This defini-
tion of antitrust dispute, by referring to state class action procedures, suggests that
the drafters intend for the AFA to apply to state, as well as federal, courts, at least
with respect to antitrust disputes.
162. S. 878, 113th Cong. § 3(1) (2013); H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. § 3(1) (2013).
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2. The Pre-Southland Interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act
If the drafters of the AFA intend to restore the FAA to its pre-Southland orig-
inal meaning, as a statute applicable solely in federal court, the passage of the
AFA would mean that both statutes would apply only in federal courts. As such,
the AFA would only prohibit federal courts from enforcing arbitration agreements
in connection with antitrust, employment, civil rights, and consumer disputes. As
a result, the AFA would have a lesser impact, and state courts would be free to
continue enforcing arbitration agreements in these contexts.
There are some arguments that the AFA is adopting the pre-Southland view.
Supporters of the AFA have described its purpose as "restor[ing] the original in-
tent of the FAA," 6 3 and as explained above, the original intent behind the FAA is
a statute applicable solely in federal court. This argument finds further support in
the introductory findings of the AFA, which describe the Supreme Court as hav-
ing issued flawed decisions expanding the meaning of the FAA.'6 These findings
strengthen the argument that the AFA is intended to correct flawed Supreme Court
decisions regarding the FAA, like Southland, and to restore the pre-Southland
interpretation that the FAA is only applicable in federal court. Thus, under the
pre-Southland view, the AFA's restrictions would apply only to federal courts.
In addition to the statements of the supporters and the Congressional findings,
there is a textual and structural argument that the AFA is adopting the pre-
Southland view. The AFA is amending section two of the FAA and leaving the
remaining sections and the unified, comprehensive nature of the FAA untouched.
The AFA would effectively amend section two of the FAA, by making arbitration
agreements in the antitrust, employment, civil rights, and consumer settings unen-
forceable. The AFA adds language directly to the end of section two, the heart of
the FAA.1 6s If the AFA is enacted, section two of the FAA would declare that
arbitration agreements are generally valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except as
provided in a new chapter of the FAA, which would contain the AFA's prohibi-
tions against compelling arbitration of antitrust, employment, civil rights, and
consumer disputes. 166  Thus, the AFA would be built upon or incorporated
through section two of the FAA, and the AFA would leave section four of the
FAA intact. As discussed above, section four, by its very terms, applies solely to
federal courts. 167 Because the FAA was enacted as a unified, comprehensive stat-
ute, section four cannot be read separately from section two.168 Thus, the drafters
163. Sen. Franken Leads Charge to Protect Legal Right to Day in Court, SEN. AL FRANKEN (May 7,
2013), http://www.franken.senate.gov/?p-press release&id=2392 ("[Over the years, the Supreme
Court has slowly broadened the reach of the FAA, ignoring evidence that the FAA was never intended
to apply to consumer or employment disputes, or to supersede all other federal laws protecting con-
sumers, workers, and small businesses."); Rep. Johnson Re-Introduces Bill to Protect Legal Rights of
Consumers, REP. HANK JOItNSON (May 7, 2013), http://hankjohnson.house.gov/press-release/rep-
johnson-re-introduces-bill-protect-legal-rights-consumers.
164. S. 878, 113th Cong. § 2(2) (2013); H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. § 2(2) (2013). Without mentioning
any case names, the Congressional findings vaguely mention how the Supreme Court is expanding the
FAA.
165. S. 878 § 3; H.R. 1844 § 3.
166. S. 878 § 3; H.R. 1844 § 3.
167. See MACNEIL, supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
168. See MACNEIL, supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
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of the AFA are adding language to the core principle set forth in section two of the
FAA, without changing any of the implementing sections of the FAA. The uni-
fied nature of the FAA and the AFA's failure to address the implementing sec-
tions of the FAA, like section four, suggest that the AFA is adopting the pre-
Southland interpretation.
These ambiguities are not merely theoretical. The AFA will likely have
strong supporters and strong opponents. Advocates of consumer and employee
rights will likely favor adoption of the AFA as a statute providing the broadest
possible protections to consumers and employees. The post-Southland view
would most resonate with such interests because this view would prohibit both
state and federal courts from enforcing arbitration agreements in the antitrust,
employment, civil rights, and consumer contexts. Conversely, corporate interests
will likely oppose the enactment of the AFA. If the AFA is enacted, the corporate
lobby will seek to limit the impact of the AFA by advocating for the pre-
Southland interpretation, which would allow states to continue to broadly enforce
arbitration agreements.
If the current version of the AFA is enacted, it is almost certain that corpora-
tions and employers, desiring to continue enforcing arbitration agreements in the
consumer and employment settings, will argue that the pre-Southland view is
correct and that state courts are free to enforce arbitration agreements in these
settings. Such arguments in favor of the pre-Southland view are not outside of the
realm of possibility, and can be made in good faith. Because the AFA does not
clearly communicate its position with regard to Southland, advocates for both
interpretations of the AFA will likely try to exploit this ambiguity in arguing that
their interpretation is correct. If the AFA is enacted in its current form, the result
could be a maddening mess of conflicting court decisions across the country.
Because of the ambiguity in the AFA, state courts will inevitably reach conflicting
decisions as to whether the AFA is adopting the pre-Southland or post-Southland
view. There will be years of expensive, needless litigation over this threshold
issue, and important statutory rights may be held in limbo while parties fight over
the meaning of the AFA. To avoid such problems, the AFA should clarify how it
relates to Southland.
Aside from potential battles between the jurisdictions' differing interpreta-
tions of the AFA, the possible overruling of Southland also raises concerns. As
explained below, if the Supreme Court were to overrule Southland, this overruling
would undermine the potential impact of the AFA.
Overruling Southland is not outside the realm of possibility. Two current Jus-
tices, Scalia and Thomas, have stated in decisions they are ready to join with oth-
ers to overrule Southland. In Allied-Bruce, Justice Scalia stated that he would no
longer dissent from future FAA cases on the grounds that Southland is wrongly
decided, but he would "stand ready" to overrule Southland if four other Justices
agreed to do so. 169 Justice Thomas has continued to dissent whenever the Su-
preme Court is reviewing a state court decision involving the FAA because he
believes Southland should be overruled. 170 The makeup of the current Supreme
169. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 285 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
170. See, e.g., Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 363 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("As I have stated
on many previous occasions, I believe that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § I et seq.
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Court is of course different from when Southland was decided in 1984, and if
three other Justices would join Justices Scalia and Thomas, the Supreme Court
could overrule Southland. Perhaps Justices sympathetic to states' rights would be
willing to overrule Southland and allow states to decide for themselves whether
arbitration agreements should be enforceable. Also, some Justices who dislike the
broad preemptive effect of the FAA may be willing to limit the FAA's application
by overruling Southland.17 ' Thus, with a new makeup of the Supreme Court, it is
possible that the Supreme Court may overrule Southland.
The Supreme Court's overruling of Southland would undermine the potential
impact of the AFA. Recall that the current version of the AFA explicitly amends
section two of the FAA.172 According to section two, as amended by the proposed
AFA, arbitration agreements are generally binding except as provided in a new
chapter of the FAA, which would contain the AFA's prohibitions against compel-
ling arbitration of antitrust, employment, civil rights, and consumer disputes.' 73 if
the Supreme Court suddenly overrules Southland, the original meaning of the
FAA would be restored, and section two will then become applicable solely in
federal court. Because it seems that the AFA's amendments to the FAA are struc-
turally linked to section two, one can argue that if section two suddenly applies
solely in federal court as a result of the overruling of Southland, the AFA would in
turn apply only in federal court as well. In other words, section two of the FAA
creates an obligation to honor arbitration agreements, and the AFA builds on sec-
tion two by carving out exceptions. The overruling of Southland would suddenly
shrink the scope of section two such that section two would apply solely in federal
court, and in turn, section two's exceptions created by the AFA would likewise
shrink and become applicable solely in federal court. Under the current version of
the AFA, which is linked to section two of the FAA, the AFA's scope can contract
or expand depending on the continued validity of Southland. If the drafters of the
AFA intend its protections to extend to state court, the overruling of Southland
would frustrate this intent.
In sum, it is unclear how the AFA will interact with the Supreme Court's
Southland opinion. If Congress enacts the AFA in its current form, there will be
bitter, long, expensive fights in state courts around the country regarding whether
courts should interpret the AFA from a pre-Southland perspective or post-
Southland perspective. Such wasteful litigation is contrary to the FAA's goal of
providing for the quick, inexpensive resolution of disputes outside of court. Also,
if the Supreme Court were to suddenly overrule Southland, such an overruling
would limit the AFA's protections for workers and consumers.
(2000 ed. and Supp. V), does not apply to proceedings in state courts."); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc.
v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
171. For example, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011), Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan dissented and believed that the majority's opinion was wrong to
construe the FAA as having a broad, preemptive effect over California state law. Id. at 1756-62.
172. S. 878, 113th Cong. § 3 (2013); H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. § 3 (2013).
173. S. 878 § 3; H.R. 1844 § 3.
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III. CORRECTING THE ARBITRATION FAIRNESS ACT To AVOID
UNNECESSARY CONFUSION AND ENSURE THE GREATEST PROTECTIONS
FOR CONSUMERS AND EMPLOYEES
The proposed AFA does not clearly establish its position regarding the Su-
preme Court's flawed Southland opinion. Congress should amend the AFA be-
fore it is enacted in order to clarify the reach of the AFA and avoid confusion and
wasteful litigation. If the sponsors of the AFA truly want to restore the FAA to its
original, pre-Southland intent, allowing the states to decide whether or not to en-
force arbitration agreements in the employment, consumer, civil rights, and anti-
trust settings, Congress should clarify that the AFA is overruling Southland.
However, if the sponsors of the AFA want to give the broadest possible pro-
tections to consumers and employees, then the AFA should be clarified so that no
court -- state or federal -- can enforce a pre-dispute arbitration agreement in the
consumer or employment context. It is likely that the sponsors would prefer to
grant the broadest possible protections to employees and consumers by granting
them unwaivable access to the federal and state judiciaries, and as explained
above, there are several justifications for such a view.174
To implement broader protections for consumers and employees and to clari-
fy the AFA and avoid years of wasteful litigation, there are some simple fixes that
Congress could make to the AFA before it is enacted. The full text of suggested
amendments appears in an appendix to this Article, but the following is an over-
view of simple changes that could be made to clarify the AFA.
First, in the introductory section of the AFA, Congress included numerous
findings.'75 A new finding should be added, recognizing that both federal and
state courts routinely enforce arbitration agreements involving employees and
consumers. Such a finding would emphasize that Congress is aware that the is-
sues regarding the enforceability of arbitration agreements exist in both state and
federal courts. Such a finding would also communicate that Congress is enacting
the AFA in an effort to rectify a problem in both state and federal courts.
Second, the current version of the AFA amends section two of the FAA by
incorporating the AFA's exceptions by reference.' 76 As mentioned above, the
AFA is linked to, and builds upon, section two. 77 If the Supreme Court were to
overrule Southland and limit the application of section two to federal courts, the
AFA's restrictions would similarly shrink in scope and only be applicable to fed-
eral courts.178 To insulate the effectiveness of the AFA from possible changes
arising from an overruling of Southland, the AFA's provisions should be disasso-
ciated from section two. Section two of the FAA should remain untouched in its
current form, without any reference to the AFA. Thus, the AFA would not be
impacted by any changing interpretations regarding section two. Also, the next
suggestion would help ensure that the scope of the AFA would no longer be de-
pendent on the continued validity of Southland.
174. See supra notes 90-113 and accompanying text.
175. S. 878 § 2; H.R. 1844 § 2.
176. S. 878 § 3; H.R. 1844 § 3.
177. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text; S. 878 § 2; H.R. 1844 § 2.
178. See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
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Third, the core provision of the AFA currently provides that "no predispute
arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of an
employment dispute, consumer dispute, antitrust dispute, or civil rights dis-
pute."l 79 Although this provision sets forth a command, this statement fails to
indicate who must follow this command. It is ambiguous whether this command
applies solely to federal courts, or if it applies to both federal and state courts.
Rephrasing the AFA by explicitly stating who must follow the law would avoid
needless confusion. Congress should amend the principal mandate of the pro-
posed AFA to provide that "no predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or
enforced in State or Federal court if it requires arbitration of an employment dis-
pute, consumer dispute, antitrust dispute, or civil rights dispute." With such an
amendment and clear prohibition applicable to both state and federal courts, cor-
porate interests would not be able to argue the AFA is ambiguous and limited
solely to federal court. Also, if Southland is overruled and the FAA becomes
applicable solely in federal court, the AFA's clear prohibitions would still restrict
both state and federal courts.
Fourth, the current version of the AFA does not clearly state under which
constitutional power Congress is enacting the AFA. Under a literal reading of the
current version of the AFA, the statute would prohibit enforcement of an arbitra-
tion agreement involving a purely intrastate consumer transaction. However,
Congress does not have such broad authority. Although the AFA does not explic-
itly state the constitutional authority for its enactment, Representative Hank John-
son of Georgia, who introduced the AFA in the House, submitted a statement for
the Congressional Record recognizing that Congress has the power to enact the
AFA pursuant to the Commerce Clause.180 To help clarify that Congress has the
power to instruct state courts not to enforce arbitration agreements in certain situa-
tions, the AFA should include a reference to interstate commerce, perhaps in the
core section of the AFA. The core section of the AFA could provide that "No
predispute arbitration agreement in connection with a transaction involving inter-
state commerce shall be valid or enforced by a State or Federal court if it requires
arbitration of an employment dispute, consumer dispute, antitrust dispute, or civil
rights dispute." Including this limitation would help insulate the AFA from con-
stitutional challenges.181
In sum, through a few, simple fixes, Congress could amend the AFA to avoid
the many issues arising from the AFA's ambiguous relationship to the Supreme
Court's flawed Southland ruling.
179. S. 878 § 3; H.R. 1844 § 3 ("(a) In General- Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, no
predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of an employ-
ment dispute, consumer dispute, antitrust dispute, or civil rights dispute.").
180. 159 CONG. REC. H2484-01 (May 7, 2013) (statement of Rep. Johnson) ("Congress has the power
to enact this legislation pursuant to the following: Article 1, Sec. 8, Cl. 3.").
181. The AFA must be limited to disputes involving interstate commerce. It would be unconstitu-
tional for the AFA to govern intrastate commerce. If Congress uses its Commerce power to ban arbi-
tration agreements, Congress could restrict the ability of both the states and the federal courts to en-
force employment and consumer arbitration agreements involving interstate commerce. U.S. CONST.
art 1, § 8, cl. 3.
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CONCLUSION
Arbitration law plays an important role in American society by defining the
role of the judiciary in facilitating private dispute resolution. With the Supreme
Court's ongoing expansion of the FAA, both the state and federal judiciaries have
lost much of their power to resolve disputes. While the AFA seemingly strips the
courts of some of their adjudicative authority, by prohibiting courts from enforc-
ing certain arbitration agreements, the AFA restores the broader judicial power to
resolve significant employment, consumer, civil rights, and antitrust disputes.
Unfortunately, the current version of the AFA contains a subtle flaw that will
undermine the purpose of the law and lead to costly, unnecessary, protracted liti-
gation over its meaning. Before enacting this important statute, which would
restore power to the courts and protect millions of Americans, Congress must
correct this flaw and clarify that the AFA addresses both the state and federal
judiciaries.
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APPENDIX
Below is the text of some suggested amendments to the Arbitration Fairness
Act of 2013, and these suggestions address the problems raised above in the Arti-
cle. Major additions to the current version of the Arbitration Fairness Act appear
below in italics, but not all changes from the current version are italicized or high-
lighted below. For example, to address some of the problems raised in the Article,
the following proposal deletes certain language currently appearing in the Arbitra-
tion Fairness Act, and deletions are not identified or highlighted in the draft be-
low.
Section 1. Short Title
This Act may be cited as the "Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013".
Section 2. Findings
The Congress finds the following:
(1) The Federal Arbitration Act (now enacted as chapter 1 of title 9 of the
United States Code) was intended to apply to disputes between commer-
cial entities of generally similar sophistication and bargaining power.
(2) The Supreme Court of the United States in a series of decisions has
interpreted the Act so that it now extends to consumer disputes and em-
ployment disputes, contrary to the intent of Congress.
(3) Most consumers and employees have little or no meaningful choice
whether to submit their claims to arbitration. State and Federal courts
routinely enforce arbitration agreements involving consumers and em-
ployees, and often, consumers and employees are not even aware that
they have given up their rights to sue in State or Federal courts.
(4) Mandatory arbitration undermines the development of public law be-
cause there is inadequate transparency and inadequate judicial review of
arbitrators' decisions.
(5) Arbitration can be an acceptable alternative when consent to the arbi-
tration is truly voluntary, and occurs after the dispute arises.
Section 3. Arbitration ofEmployment, Consumer, Antitrust, and Civil
Rights Disputes
Definitions:
(1) the term "antitrust dispute" means a dispute-
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(A) involving a claim for damages allegedly caused by a violation of the
antitrust laws (as defined in subsection (a) of the first section of the Clay-
ton Act (15 U.S.C. 12)) or State antitrust laws; and
(B) in which the plaintiffs seek certification as a class under rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or a comparable rule or provision of
State law;
(2) the term "civil rights dispute" means a dispute-
(A) arising under-
(i) the Constitution of the United States or the constitution of a State; or
(ii) a Federal or State statute that prohibits discrimination on the basis of
race, sex, disability, religion, national origin, or any invidious basis in
education, employment, credit, housing, public accommodations and fa-
cilities, voting, or program funded or conducted by the Federal Govern-
ment or State government, including any statute enforced by the Civil
Rights Division of the Department of Justice and any statute enumerated
in section 62(e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to unlaw-
ful discrimination); and
(B) in which at least 1 party alleging a violation of the Constitution of the
United States, a State constitution, or a statute prohibiting discrimination
is an individual;
(3) the term "consumer dispute" means a dispute between an individual
who seeks or acquires real or personal property, services (including ser-
vices relating to securities and other investments), money, or credit for
personal, family, or household purposes and the seller or provider of such
property, services, money, or credit;
(4) the term "employment dispute" means a dispute between an employer
and employee arising out of the relationship of employer and employee
as defined in section 3 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29
U.S.C. 203); and
(5) the term "predispute arbitration agreement" means any agreement to
arbitrate a dispute that had not yet arisen at the time of the making of the
agreement.
No predispute arbitration agreement in connection with a transaction involv-
ing interstate commerce shall be valid or enforced by a State or Federal court if it
requires arbitration of an employment dispute, consumer dispute, antitrust dispute,
or civil rights dispute.
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Section 4. Applicability
(1) IN GENERAL - An issue as to whether the Arbitration Fairness Act
of 2013 applies to an arbitration agreement shall be determined under
Federal law. The applicability of the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013 to
an agreement to arbitrate and the validity and enforceability of an agree-
ment to which the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013 applies shall be de-
termined by a court, rather than an arbitrator, irrespective of whether the
party resisting arbitration challenges the arbitration agreement specifical-
ly or in conjunction with other terms of the contract containing such
agreement.
(2) COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS - Nothing in the
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013 shall apply to any arbitration provision
in a contract between an employer and a labor organization or between
labor organizations, except that no such arbitration provision shall have
the effect of waiving the right of an employee to seek judicial enforce-
ment of a right arising under a provision of the Constitution of the United
States, a State constitution, or a Federal or State statute, or public policy
arising therefrom.
Section 5. Technical and Conforming Amendments
(1) IN GENERAL- Title 9 of the United States Code is amended-
(A) in section 1, by striking "of seamen," and all that follows through
"interstate commerce";
(B) in section 208-
(i) in the section heading, by striking "Chapter 1; residual application"
and inserting "Application"; and
(ii) by adding at the end the following: "This chapter applies to the extent
that this chapter is not in conflict with the Arbitration Fairness Act of
2013."; and
(C) in section 307-
(i) in the section heading, by striking "Chapter 1; residual application"
and inserting "Application"; and
(ii) by adding at the end the following: "This chapter applies to the extent
that this chapter is not in conflict with the Arbitration Fairness Act of
2013".
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(A) CHAPTER 2- The table of sections for chapter 2 of title 9, United
States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to section 208 and
inserting the following:
"208. Application.".
(B) CHAPTER 3- The table of sections for chapter 3 of title 9, United
States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to section 307 and
inserting the following:
"307. Application.".
Section 6. Effective Date
This Act, and the amendments made by this Act, shall take effect on the date
of enactment of this Act and shall apply with respect to any dispute or claim that
arises on or after such date.
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